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In recent years, the concept of a 'prohibition against representation' and its ethical and political implications for artistic practices past, present and future have been subjected to renewed critical scrutiny. While this interdiction derives from the Second Commandment given by God to Moses, forbidding the creation of graven images or idols, it has frequently been invoked in secular contexts, and has acquired special resonance in ongoing debates about the difficulty of adequately representing the event which has been called the Holocaust or Shoah. The persistent claim that the Nazis' persecution of the Jews and other communities remains beyond or unsusceptible to representation, and more specifically the assertion that it cannot or should not be recuperated within images, are often informed by a particular understanding of the Bilderverbot (as the prohibition described above is often known). However, certain survivors and scholars have queried whether it is legitimate or helpful to reactivate this injunction in the aftermath of such atrocities. Jorge Semprun, Jacques Rancière, Jean-Luc Nancy and others have variously criticised this move, along with associated rhetorics of 'ineffability', as confused and obscurantist, politically misleading and morally suspect. 1 Nancy, the author of one of the most forceful critiques in this vein, warns that the allegation that representation of the Holocaust is illegitimate rests on a misunderstanding or misapplication of the original religious prohibition which he seeks to correct;
'"representation of the Shoah"', he concludes, 'is not only possible and licit, but in fact 'Fragile Faces: Levinas and Lanzmann', vol. 11, no Discussing Holocaust literature and cinema, Semprun, for example, refutes 'a priori' interdictions on representation: 'No-one, no court, can pronounce in advance on whether this or that can or cannot be written or filmed. There can be no prohibition on this' (Semprun 2000, 11) . Rancière attempts to demonstrate that such interdictions lack a coherent philosophical foundation: 'There is no property of the event which prohibits representation, which prohibits art, even in the sense of artifice. Unrepresentability does not exist as a property of the event. There are only choices' (Rancière 2001, 96) .
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also necessary and imperative' (Nancy 2003, 61) .
In the light of these assertive recent interventions, it seems timely to revisit two earlier and seminal accounts of representation which caution that the Bilderverbot cannot be dismissed quite so straightforwardly. (Eaglestone 2004, 249-250) . Jill Robbins proposes more specifically that Levinas's rejection of art may be 'to some extent a response to the Holocaust', though she notes, too, that on those occasions 'when Levinas does speak positively about art, (…) that art always has a relation to the Holocaust' (Robbins 1999, 133) . By reading Levinas in parallel with Lanzmann, I hope to show here, furthermore, that his reflections on the ethical significance of the prohibition against images are highly pertinent to issues at stake in the ongoing conversation about representation of, and after, the Holocaust.
In staging an encounter between Levinas and Lanzmann, the broader aim of this essay, in common with others collected here, is to forge connections between Levinas's thought and filmic practice. If Levinas had little to say about cinema, the appearance of explicit references to his work in recent films, such as Jean-Luc Godard's Notre musique (2004) , suggests that cinema, at least, has something to say about Levinas. 2 Following the lead of a handful of critics who have begun to investigate these affinities (see, most 'Fragile Faces: Levinas and Lanzmann', vol. 11, no 
Levinas: Bilderverbot and visage
In 'La Réalité et son ombre' ('Reality and its Shadow') Levinas makes a passing but significant reference to the Second Commandment: 'The proscription of images is truly the supreme commandment of monotheism, a doctrine that overcomes fate, that 'Fragile Faces: Levinas and Lanzmann', vol. 11, no. 2: proscription over three decades later in 'Interdit de la représentation et "Droits de l'homme"' ('The Prohibition against Representation and "The Rights of Man"'), an essay which has so far received less attention from his commentators. Here he engages with the commandment in a more sustained way and in terms which confirm the suspicion that it implicitly informs many of his other writings, in tandem with the Sixth Commandment ('you shall not murder') which does so explicitly. This essay is dedicated What is particularly compelling in this context about the prohibition against representation is that it acknowledges the transcendence which is proper to the relation to the Other but which is overlooked in perception: 'Fragile Faces: Levinas and Lanzmann', vol. 11, no. 2: This transcendence is alive in the relation to the other man, i.e. in the proximity of one's fellow man, whose uniqueness and consequently whose irreducible alterity would be -still or already -unrecognized in the perception that stares at [dé-visage] the other (ibid. 110).
The word-play in the final phrase of this sentence is revealing (the hyphenated 'dé-visage' might be translated as 'stares' or 'defaces'), for in Levinas's account, that which cannot 'give itself' in representation is 'the uniqueness of the unique that is expressed in the face' (ibid. 108). Levinas explains elsewhere that his term 'visage' does not refer exactly or exclusively to a human face (Levinas 1984b, 344) . Nor does it allude simply or primarily to something that we can see. Despite his use of vocabulary associated with vision, Levinas strips the face of its habitual meanings as a phenomenon that appears in the visible world, an object of perception: 'one can say that the face is not "seen". It is what cannot become a content, which your thought would embrace; it is uncontainable, it leads you beyond' (Levinas 1982, 91) .
Levinas clarifies in Totalité et
infini that rather than appearing to me, the face expresses, signifies and speaks, addressing and commanding me from a position beyond the perceptual field (see, for example, Levinas 1961, 21-2, 37-8) . As such, it reveals itself 'without the intermediary of any image'; indeed, it incessantly 'destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure ' (ibid. 174, 21) . Levinas pursues these insights further in 'Interdit de la représentation et "Droits de l'homme"', where he asserts that the epiphany of the face is 'refractory to the image': 'Beneath the plasticity of the face
[ figure] that appears, the face [visage] is already missed. It is frozen in art itself' (Levinas 1984a, 112, 110) . The face cannot be captured in representation, which would reduce it to immobility, reappropriate its alterity and silence its address. Françoise Armengaud, glossing Levinas, explains that the face is not only unique but also 'essentially nonduplicable; it has no double, no shadow, no copy, no portrait' (Armengaud 2005) . In other words, it is the face of the Other that forms the proper foundation and object of the prohibition against representation; it is in its epiphany that 'an "unheard of command" or "the word of God" is heard' (Levinas 1984a, 112) .
Put simply, then, Levinas finds in the Bilderverbot a validation of his conception of ethical relations: 'the ancient, biblical call and command (…) awakens the subject to a responsibility for the other' (Levinas 1984a, 113 Baudry 1970; Metz 1984) . This paradigm inverts the asymmetrical structure of the Levinasian encounter, where it is the Other who calls the self into question. As Sarah Cooper observes, 'a Levinasian-inspired theory of viewing would necessarily posit a space beyond subject/object relations, which is crucial for an opening to otherness' (Cooper 2006, 19 The Holocaust is unique first of all in that it erects around itself, in a circle of flames, a limit which cannot be breached because a certain absolute of horror is intransmissible: to claim to do so is to make oneself guilty of the most serious sort of transgression. Fiction is a transgression; I profoundly think that there is a prohibition on representation (Lanzmann 1994, vii LaCapra 1998). Whether or not his ends justify his means, a Levinasian critique of these strategies might charge Lanzmann with reappropriating the alterity of his witnesses and their depositions to the extent that he refuses to allow them to put his own place at risk. 'Fragile Faces: Levinas and Lanzmann', vol. 11, no. 2: 8 If a Levinasian reading of Shoah must contend with Lanzmann's self-positioning as filmmaker, interviewer and, in certain cases, as camera-operator, the pertinent question in the current context is whether this reduces his subjects to objects of perception and knowledge, or whether and how they resist this. Lanzmann accords us visual access to his witnesses primarily through medium and close-up shots of their faces. For better or worse, the face has long been cinema's privileged subject, where it has been transformed through the close-up into a spectacle, an incarnation of unspoken or unspeakable truths, an originary signifier whose meanings can never be stabilised or exhausted. 4 Under Lanzmann's lens, the faces of the German and Polish perpetrators and bystanders become the site of a multitude of micro-movements which offer a silent but involuntarily illuminating commentary on the witnesses' testimony. During these interviews, the facial close-up sometimes functions as a lie-detector, exposing the inconsistencies, half-truths or barefaced untruths which punctuate the witness's account.
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The images of the faces of the survivor-witnesses, however, signify differently, breaking with the cinematic tradition mentioned above by progressively dismantling the myth of the face as the veracious expression of an interiority, the locus of a privileged relationship to the real. While any generalisation about the witnesses' faces in Shoah risks denying the irreducible singularity of each, what is particularly disconcerting about a number of the survivors' expressions, notably those of Simon Srebnik, Rudolf Vrba, Filip Müller and Abraham Bomba, is their habitually impregnable impassivity. The camera repeatedly lingers on these faces, inviting us to scan them for insights into the past and the present, yet even when the witnesses are remembering the most excruciating suffering, their faces often remain inexpressive, deadpan, at once unreadable and available to a multiplicity of readings. A number of deportees have reflected upon the violence that was inflicted -at once literally and metaphoricallyupon the human face in the Nazi camps (see, for instance, Antelme 1957, 57-58; Levi 1966, 103) . Drawing on such testimonies, Nancy ventures that 'the question of the representation of the camps is none other than that of the representation of a face which has itself been deprived of a representation and a gaze' (Nancy 2003, 92) . While he does not explicitly refer to Levinas here, Nancy's argument at this juncture recalls the Levinasian notion of a visage which calls representation into question. If, on one level, the survivors' faces in Shoah bear witness to the enduring effects of violation and privation, on another level, they attest to the limits of representation both in their resistance to a definitive reading and in their refusal, at pivotal moments, to reveal anything at all. These images ultimately offer us no purchase either on the witnesses or on the traumatic experiences they recount.
In the course of such sequences, Shoah strips the face of spectacular qualities and re-maps it instead as a trauma site. In the absence of direct images of the past, the survivor's face becomes the place not only where trauma is visually registered but also where the interdiction on representation is affirmed. In this way, the visible face incessantly points to or signifies something beyond the visible, something that perpetually eludes our vision and escapes our knowledge and understanding. To clarify:
this is not to suggest that the real, human faces of the survivor-witnesses in Shoah can be read as representations of the Levinasian visage, which exceeds and undoes any image we attempt to form of it; what concerns me here instead are the ways in which 'Fragile Faces: Levinas and Lanzmann', vol. 11, no these faces resist reduction to visible phenomena and the possibility that this preserves an opening onto alterity.
Crucial to this opening is language. One of the key means by which Lanzmann reactivates the prohibition against representation and avoids reducing his filmic subjects to objects of our gaze is by consistently privileging the word over the image. While
Lanzmann, like Levinas, 5 is interested in the ethical significance of non-verbal forms of expression (as demonstrated, for example, by the numerous occasions on which the camera continues to linger on the witness's face after he or she has fallen silent), language and its relationship with alterity simultaneously emerge as pivotal preoccupations for both. In Totalité et infini speech is identified as a central component and expression of the ethical relation with the Other: 'The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already discourse' (Levinas 1961, 37) . In the relation of language, moreover, 'the essential is the interpellation, the vocative', which maintains the other 'in his heterogeneity' (Levinas 1961, 41) . In line with Levinas's concerns, Shoah addresses its audience and evokes the alterity of the traumatic past primarily through discourse. The film interpellates us not only as spectators but also, and perhaps most significantly, as listeners. The witnesses appear first and foremost as sources of language, and it is as speaking faces, talking heads, that they resist reduction to objects of our perception. It is through the singularity and unpredictability of their spoken depositions that they confront us with new and unexpected meanings and realities, calling our preconceived ideas into question and probing the limits of knowledge in the face of their experiences. The priority which Lanzmann grants to audition over vision -to oral over visual modes of access to the past -is thus in keeping with Levinas's reflections on the ways in which the visage reveals itself and on the prohibition against representation which it expresses. The Bilderverbot is reiterated in Shoah in the disjunctive relationship between voice and image, between the atrocities described by the witnesses and the empty, derelict and deceptively tranquil murder sites to which they return in the present.
Furthermore, it is through oral testimony that Shoah makes manifest the absence of those faces Lanzmann cannot or chooses not to show yet whose experiences remain the central subject of the film: the missing faces of the dead. Commenting on the 'Fragile Faces: Levinas and Lanzmann', vol. 11, no. 2: 10 5 See Critchley for an account of the privileged place which Levinas reserves for non-verbal communication (Critchley 1992, 177-180 the unique expression of the voice and of the singing both expresses and covers the silence, in much the same way as the unique expression of the face (…) both covers and expresses the deliberate and striking absence of dead bodies from Shoah's screen. It is indeed the living body and the living face of the returning witness that, in Shoah, becomes a speaking figure for the stillness and the muteness of the bodies (Felman 1992, 281-282) .
For Felman, then, the living faces and voices of the survivors figure or attest to the missing faces and testimonies of those who perished, without supplanting this absence.
If Shoah invites us to read the survivor's face as a screen in the double sense of the term (as a blank surface onto which the action is projected and as a protective partition or veil which conceals the action from view), as the survivor speaks or sings, the film screen opens onto a face in the Levinasian sense, insofar as it directs attention beyond itself towards an otherness which cannot be recuperated in images.
In Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence Judith Butler articulates the fragile relationship between humanity, representation and the visage in the following terms:
For Levinas, (…) the human is not represented by the face. Rather, the human is indirectly affirmed in that very disjunction that makes representation impossible, and this disjunction is conveyed in the impossible representation. For representation to convey the human, then, representation must not only fail, but it must show its failure. (…) In this sense, the human is not identified with what is represented but neither is it identified with the unrepresentable; it is, rather, that which limits the success of any representational practice. The face is not 'effaced' in this failure of representation, but is constituted in that very possibility (Butler 2004, 144 ).
Butler's argument rehabilitates representation as revelatory of the face precisely to the extent that it fails to represent it and -crucially -acknowledges this failure. As it probes the limits of the image, Shoah, I would argue, moves towards such an acknowledgement. Renov warns that 'given the conditions of capture and reproducibility that govern nonfiction media, we can assume that no documentative practice can meet 'Fragile Faces: Levinas and Lanzmann', vol. 11, no (Renov 2004, 157 ). Yet he is surely right to suggest that Levinas's prioritisation of the ethical might nevertheless help to free documentary theory up from its persistent preoccupation with ontology and epistemology (Renov 2004, 159, 161) . In
Shoah ethical relations are accorded precedence over questions of being and knowledge. The film consistently frustrates our desire to see, know and understand by refusing to allow the other and his or her history to take shape as objects under our gaze. By holding us at a distance the images and voices afford a more intimate encounter with traumatic experience, opening up the possibility of proximity while preserving separation. In so doing, they call Levinas's critique of images and vision as inherently totalising into question. If Lanzmann's reluctance to visualise the past directly and privileging of oral over visual witnessing appear to affirm the Bilderverbot revalidated by Levinas, reinvigorating it in the aftermath of the violence of the Holocaust, his film
shows that -paradoxically -the cinematic image has a vital ethical role to play in this process.
